# No-Regret Algorithms in non-Truthful Auctions with Budget and ROI Constraints

Giannis Fikioris (while SR at Google), Gagan Aggarwal, Mingfei Zhao


Google Reserach & Cornell University

# Setup

# Algorithm

### Automated Bidding

Global digital advertising: \$750bn in 2024



Automated bidder interacting with stochastic environment T rounds

### Player Model

Budget B & ROI constant  $\gamma$ 

Value  $v_t$  and highest competing bid  $d_t$ 

maximize value: 
$$\sum_{t} v_{t} \mathbf{1} \begin{bmatrix} b_{t} \geq d_{t} \end{bmatrix}$$
 subject budget: 
$$\sum_{t} b_{t} \mathbf{1} \begin{bmatrix} b_{t} \geq d_{t} \end{bmatrix} \leq B$$
 ROI: 
$$\sum_{t} b_{t} \mathbf{1} \begin{bmatrix} b_{t} \geq d_{t} \end{bmatrix} \leq \gamma \sum_{t} v_{t} \mathbf{1} \begin{bmatrix} b_{t} \geq d_{t} \end{bmatrix}$$

Stationary environment:  $(v_t, d_t) \sim \mathcal{D}$ 

### Learning to bid

Bidding function:  $b_t = f(v_t)$ 

Any  $f \implies \text{impossible to learn}$ 

Class of bidding functions  ${\mathcal F}$ 

[Lucier, Pattathil, Slivkins, Zhang] & [Fikioris, Tardos]:

 $\mathcal{F} = linear functions$ 

▶ loss of utility in simple examples:

· Value  $v_t \sim U[0,1]$ 

· Competing bid  $d_t = 1/2$ 

This work:  $\mathcal{F} = \text{Lipschitz functions}$ 

### Theorem 1 - Full Information

Online learning algorithm that

- exact budget and ROI satisfaction
- total value  $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$  suboptimal wrt optimal Lipschitz bidding

When  $d_t$  is not revealed after round t:

### Theorem 2 - Bandit information

No algorithm  $O(T^{2/3})$  suboptimal, even if  $v_t=1$ There exists algorithm that is  $\widetilde{O}(T^{3/4})$  suboptimal

All results apply to

- first-price/second-price/hybrid auctions
- value maximizers or quasi-linear utilities

### Primal / Dual Framework

Maximize / Minimize Lagrangian:

$$\max_{f} \quad \min_{\lambda,\mu} \quad \left( v_t + \lambda \cdot \left( \frac{B}{T} - f(v_t) \right) + \mu \cdot \left( \gamma v_t - f(v_t) \right) \right) \mathbf{1} \left[ f(v_t) \ge d_t \right]$$


Online algorithms that pick f and  $\lambda, \mu$ .

[Castiglioni, Celli, Kroer]: OGD for  $\lambda, \mu$  & "right" primal for f

▶ low error for constrained problem

Full Paper Link

## Full information



### Safe bidding

Bidding function  $f \in \mathcal{F}$  could have negative Lagrangian reward "Safe" bid for round t:  $b_t^{\circ} = \min\left\{\frac{1+\mu_t}{\lambda_t+\mu_t}v_t, 1\right\}$ 

▶ If  $\exists d_t$  where  $f(v_t)$  has negative reward,  $b_t^{\circ}$  always better

### Tree algorithm

 $\mathcal{F}_{\varepsilon}$ :  $\varepsilon$ -cover of Lipschitz functions,  $|\mathcal{F}_{\varepsilon}| = \exp(\Theta(1/\varepsilon))$ 

▶ Hedge would get  $T^{2/3}$  regret

Arrange  $\mathcal{F}_{\varepsilon}$  into a tree where "similar" functions are "close"

- ▶ Leaves are fixed  $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\varepsilon}$
- ▶ Non-leaves combine children via Hedge-like algorithm

Similar to [Cesa-Bianchi, Gaillard, Gentile, Gerchinovitz] and [Han, Zhou, Flores, Ordentlich, Weissman]

### Range-agnostic Regret

Reward upper bound  $U_t \propto \lambda_t, \mu_t$  unknown before round t

Hedge with learning rate  $\eta_t \propto \frac{1}{U_t}$  achieves regret  $O(U_t \sqrt{t})$ 

ightharpoonup similar to  $U_t$  being known

### Interval Regret

Primal/Dual framework requires interval regret

Low regret in every interval  $[T_1, T_2]$ 

Black-box reduction: standard regret  $\mathcal{A} \implies$  interval regret

▶ Hedge over T instances of  $\mathcal{A}$ , each starting at round t

# **Exact ROI Satisfaction**

Previous algorithm violates ROI

▶ but whp violation  $\leq O(\sqrt{T})$ 

Black box reduction: when constraint almost violated, bid to

$$\max_{t} \quad (\gamma v_{t} - f(v_{t})) \mathbf{1} \left[ f(v_{t}) \geq d_{t} \right]$$

Re-formulation of Lagrangian

▶ safe bids ensures non-negative

Used for  $\tau$  rounds, increases slack by  $\Theta(\tau) - O(\sqrt{\tau})$ 

Dynamic instead of static ([Feng, Padmanabhan, Wang])

### **Bandit Information**

 $v_t = 1$ , no ROI

Base CDF: "All" bids optimal

Perturbation hides optimal bid

- ► Small enough: hard to find
- ► Large enough: need to find

 $\Omega(T^{2/3})$  regret

Similar to [Kleinberg, Leighton]

